IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND FOUR

PRESENT

**THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE B. SUDERSHAN REDDY**

**and**
**THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.C. BHANU**

**WRIT PETITION Nos. 7368, 21542 of 1999,**

**1662 and 1869 of 2000**

**W.P.No.7368 of 1999:**

Between:

**Gulam Mohd. Omar Khan, S/o. Late Mohd. Afzal Khan, H.No.13-6-437/1, Khadar Bagh, Hyderabad.**

..... PETITIONER

**AND**

1. **The Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, at Hyderabad, rep. by its Registrar, Burugula Ramakrishna Rao Buildings, Lower Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad.**

2. **The State, Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad.**

3. **M/s. Madan ;Mohanlal Shriram Pvt., Ltd., a Company incorporated under Indian Companies Act, havingits registered Office at Sanskrithi Bhavan, Jhandewalan,New Delhi, rep. by its G.P.A., Sri**

**M.L.Motwari.**

**(Other respondents are not necessary parties to this writ petition as no relief is claimed against them).**

....RESPONDENTS

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the High Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of CERTIORARI to call for the records relating to L.G.C.No.140/89 dt.16/07/1998 and quash the same as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction.

**Counsel for the Petitioner: MR.N.VASUDEVA REDDY**

**Counsel for the Respondent Nos.1&2: G.P.FOR REVENUE**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.3: MR.M.S.R. SUBRAHMANYAM**

W.P.No.21542 of 1999:

Between:

1. **Bethapudi Modaiah S/o Late Kondaiah,**
   **R/O Siddartha Nagar, Vinukonda, Guntur District.**
2. **Bethapudi Seshaprasad, S/o. Modaiah,**
   **R/o.Siddartha Nagar, Vinukonda, Guntur District.**
3. **Smt. G.Bharathi, W/o G.Narayana Rao,**
   **R/o. Siddartha Nagar, Vinukonda, Guntur District.**
4. **Bethapudi Srimannarayana Prasad, S/o. Modaiah,**
   **R/o.Siddartha Nagar, Vinukonda, Guntur District.**
5. **Bethapudi Ramakrishna Prasad S/o. Modaiah,**
   **R/o. Flat No.119, 8-3-991, Srinagar Colony,**
   **Hyderabad-873.**

..... PETITIONERS

**AND**

1. **State of A.P., rep. by its Revenue Divisional Officer,**
   **Hyderabad.**
2. **Ghulam Mohammad Omar Khan, S/o. Late Afzal Khan**
   **R/o.H.No. 13-6-436/1, Khader Bagh, Bairhan, Hyderabad,**

**A.P.**

3. **Mohd. Yousuf Patel, S/o. Mohd. Moulana,**
   **R/o.H.No.11-2-653, Habibnagar, Hyderabad, A.P.,**
4. **Madan Mohan Lal Sriram Pvt. Ltd., rep. by Sri Dinesh Viza**

**Purkar, having itsregistered office at Jhandewalan, New**

**Delhi.**

**5. The Special Court under the A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition)**

**Act, at Hyderabad, rep. by its Registrar, B.R.K.R. Bhavan, Hyderabad.**

**6. Sri Dandanthapani Cooperative Housing Society (TAB**

**NO.487), rep. by its President Smt.K.Vijaya, W/o.Late Sri Sai**

**Baba, R/o. 12-13-215, Street No.16 Taranaka,**

**Secunderabad.**

**(R6 is impleaded as per Court Orders in W.P.M.P.No.13267 of 2002 dated 18.7.2002)**

.....RESPONDENTS

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the High Court may be pleased to issue Rule Nisi Call for the records in L.G.C.No.140/89 dt. 16/07/1998 and quash the same by declaring that the petitioners are the owners of the property situated in Sy.No.129/5 situated in Road No.2, Banjara Hills, Shaikpet, Hyderabad and in alternative declare that the petitioners have perfected their title by adverse possession over the property situated in Sy No. 129/5 to an extent of Ac.2-00 situated in Road No. 2, Banjara Hills, Shaikpet Village, Hyderabad.

**Counsel for the Petitioners: MR.V.R.AVULA**

**Counsel for the Respondent Nos.2&5: G.P. for Revenue.**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.4: MR. M.S.R. SUBRAHMANYAM**

Counsel for the Respondent No.6: Mr.K.Ashok Reddy.

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W.P.No.1662 of 2000:

**Between:**

**Gulam Mohd. Omar Khan, S/o.late Mohd. Afzal Khan,**

**R/o.H.No.13-6-437/1, Khadar Bagh, Hyderabad.**

….Petitioner

**AND**

1. **The Special Court under A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, at Hyderabad, rep. by its Registrar, Burgula Rama**

**Kishan Rao Buildings, Lower Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad.**

2. **M/s.Madan Mohanlal Sriram Pvt., Ltd., A company incorporated under Indian Companies Act, having its registered office at Sanskrit Bhavan, Jhandewalan, New Delhi, rep. by its G.P.A., Sri M.L.Mothwari,**

3. **Secretary to Govt. of A.P., rep. by Revenue Department, Hyderabad.**

4. **The Collector, Hyderabad District, Nampally Station Road, Hyderabad.**

5. **The Mandal Revenue Officer, Golconda Mandal, Vijayanagar Colony, Hyderabad.**

6. **The Municipal Corporation ofHyderabad, Lower Tank Bund, Hyderabad.**

....Respondents

Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of writ of CERTIORARI to call for the records relating to the Order dated 28.10.1999 made in I.A.No.72/99 in L.G.C.No.267 of 1999, and quash the same as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction and set aside the same.

**Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr.N.Vasudeva Reddy.**

**Counsel for the Respondent Nos.1,3 to 5: G.P. for Revenue.**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.2:Mr. M.S.R.Subrahmanyam.**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.6:** NONE APPEARED.

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**W. P.No. 1869 of 2000**

Between:

**Gulam Mohd. Oman Khan, S/o. Late Mohd. Afzal Khan, R/o. H.No.13-6-437/1, Khadar Bagh, Hyderabad.**

..... PETITIONER

**AND**

**1. The Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition)**

**Act, at Hyderabad, rep. by its Registrar, Burugula Ram Krishna Rao Buildings, Lower Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad.**

**2. M/s.Madan Mohanlal Sriram Pvt. Limited, a Company incorporated under Indian Companies Act, having its Registered Office at Sanskrit Bhavan, Jhandewalan, New Delhi, rep. by its G.P.A., Sri M.L .Motwari.**

.....RESPONDENTS

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the High Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiori to call for the records relating to the order dated 28.10.1999, made in I.A.No.71/99 in LGC No.226/94 and quash the same as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction and set aside the same.

**Counsel for the Petitioner: MR.N.VASUDEVA REDDY**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.1: G.P. for Revenue.**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.2: MR.M.S.R. SUBRAHMANYAM**

The Court made the following :

**The Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Sudershan Reddy**

**a n d**

**The Hon'ble Sri Justice K.C. Bhanu**

**W.P. No. 7368 OF 1999**
**W.P. 21542 OF 1999**
**W.P. 1662 OF 2000**
**AND**
**W.P. 1869 OF 2000**

**COMMON ORDER**: (per Sri Justice K.C. Bhanu)

All the writ petitions are disposed of by a common order since the point *at issue* involved in all the writ petitions is in respect of Ac.2-00 out of total extent of Ac.9-26 guntas in S.No.129/5

corresponding to old S.No.403 of Shaikpet village, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.

W.P. 7368 of 1999 is filed by Gulam Mohd. Omar Khan, who is the 1st respondent in L.G.C.140 of 1989, for issuance of a writ more particularly one in the nature of writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to L.G.C. 140 of 1989 dated 16.7.1998 and quash the same as arbitrary and illegal and without jurisdiction.

W.P. No. 1662 of 2000 is filed for issuance of a writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to the order dated 28.10.1999 made in I.A. 72 of 1999 in L.G.C. 267 of 1999 and quash the same.

W.P. No. 1869 of 2000 is filed for issuance of a writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to the order dated 28.10.1999 made in I.A. 71 of 1999 in L.G.C. 266 of 1994 and quash the same.

W.P. 21542 of 1999 is filed by the respondents 3 to 7 in L.G.C. 140 of 1989 for issuance of a writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to L.G.C. 140 of 1989 dated 16.7.1998 and quash the same by declaring the petitioners in this writ petition as the owners of the property; in the alternative, they pray to declare that they have perfected their title by adverse possession.

The brief facts leading to filing of these writ petitions may be delineated as follows:

For the purpose of better appreciation of the facts, the parties are referred to as arrayed in L.G.C. 140 of 1989 on the file of Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad filed an application under Section 7(1) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, 'Land Grabbing Act') for a declaration that respondents 1 and 2 are land grabbers and for their eviction and for delivery of possession of the application schedule property. Another prayer is for awarding of compensation of Rs.26,13,600/- for wrongful possession, profits accrued thereon in a sum of Rs.31,36,320/- and for costs. The respondents 3 to 7 filed an application in I.A. 101 of 1990 to implead them as respondents. Accordingly the petition was ordered by an order of the Special Court dated 31.12.1991. The 8th respondent also got impleaded in the said L.G.C. vide an order passed in I.A. 347 of 1993 dated 23.4.1993.

The case of the applicant-Government is that the application schedule property admeasuring Ac.2-00 is in S.No.403/part correlated to T.S. No.4/1/1/C, Block 'D', Ward 10 of Shaikpet village within the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and the said extent of land belongs to the State Government. It is further alleged that Shaikpet village of Golconda mandal was formerly a Sarfekhas village and after merger of Sarfekhas with Diwani in 1358 Fasli the Sarfekhas vested in the Government. The initial survey of Sarfekhas village property was conducted in 1326 Fasli and a Sethwar was issued in 1330 Fasli. In pursuance of the said Sethwar, the entire extent of land in S.No.129 was classified as Government land. During 1331 Fasli, a supplementary Sethwar was issued sub-dividing the S.No.129 into 10 sub-divisions as S.Nos.129/1 to 129/10. Again in 1334 Fasli, another supplementary Sethwar was issued

deleting the last Survey No.353. Therefore, the S.No. 403 was corresponding to old S.No.129/1 admeasuring 3,079-37 guntas. The subject matter of the litigation being in S.No.403 belongs to the State and hence the Government claims that it is the owner of the application schedule property and the respondents have no claim whatsoever.

The 1st respondent filed the counter *inter alia* contending that they have filed a suit in O.S. 443 of 1989 on the file of IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the State as well as the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and in that suit a temporary injunction was also granted in their favour restraining the applicant-Government from interfering with their possession. It is admitted that the property originally belonged to the Surfekhas Mubarak and was situated in old S.No.129/5 but they contend that the Surfekhas authorities granted patta in favour of one Rasheed Ahmed on 12th Isfandar 1340 Fasli. It is also stated that the entire extent of S.No.129/5 admeasuring Ac.9-26 guntas was sold to respondents 1 and 2 by the said Rasheed Ahmed by a registered sale deed dated 7.10.1959 and ever since the date of purchase the respondents have been in actual physical possession of the land and thereafter they have made it into plots and submitted a lay-out plan to the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and obtained sanction on 18.6.1996 and gave the same for development to the other respondents. Therefore, they have stated that they are the owners of the application schedule property.

The 2nd respondent filed a counter taking the same pleas as were taken by the 1st respondent in his counter. Whereas, the 8th respondent filed a counter stating that it purchased plot No.8 admeasuring Ac.3-20 guntas in S.No.403 (old S.No.129) situated at Shaikpet village and the application schedule property forms part of the said extent of Ac.3-20 guntas. It is further stated that Ac.3-20 guntas originally formed part of plot bearing No.20 of Jubilee Hills Municipality. The said Municipality allotted the said plot to Late Raja Eknath Prasad. On his death his wife Laxmi Bhai authorized one Shaheed Ali Khan to pay the balance of consideration to the Municipality. Subsequently on the application of Shaheed Ali Khan, the M.C.H. allotted plot No.8in lieu of plot 20 as Jubilee Hills Municipality was abolished. Shaheed Ali Khan, wife of Rai EknathPrasad, also sold the property to ShaheedAli by a registered sale deed dated 24.10.1961 who in turn sold the property to R-8 and ever since the 8th respondent has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof as absolute owner. While the matter stood thus, one Jayamala Reddy tried to interfere with the possession of the 8th respondent and therefore the 8th respondent filed O.S. 107 of 1968 on the file of Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hydrabad for declaration of title and for perpetual injunction. The said suit was decreed on 10th March 1975 declaring the title of the 8th respondent to the entire extent of the property i.e. Ac.3-20 guntas in old S.No.129 corresponding to new S.No.403. Challenging the same, the State has not preferred any appeal but the 1st defendant therein Jayamala Reddy filed C.C.C.A. No. 105 of 1975 assailing the judgment and decree in O.S. 107 of 1968. The said appeal was dismissed by a

Division Bench of this court vide its judgment dated 13.10.1982. A Special Leave Petition filed by Mrs. Jayamala Reddy was also dismissed and thus the judgment rendered by the City Civil Court operates as res judicata in these proceedings. He further contended that the respondents 1 and 2 have no title to the application schedule property and the application is liable to be dismissed.

Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues were framed by the Special Court:

1. Whether the application schedule property belongs to the applicant?
2. Whether the respondents are not land grabbers?
3. Whether the application is barred by time?
4. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application?
5. To what relief?

Additional issue was framed on 14.11.1994 to the following effect:

> Whether the respondents 1 and 2 or any of them perfected title to the schedule property by adverse possession?

To substantiate the case of the applicants, the M.R.O. Secunderabad was examined himself as PW-1 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-10. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2, they themselves examined as RWs 1 and 2 and marked Exs.B-1 to B-30. On behalf of 8th respondent, the General Power of Attorney holder of R-8 was

examined as RW-3 and Exs.B-31 to B-65 were marked.

The learned Special Court after consideration of both oral and documentary evidence held that the respondents 1 and 2 cannot claim title or possession in respect of the application schedule property and the judgment rendered in O.S. 107 of 1968 operates as *res judicata* in these proceedings vis-à-vis the applicant-State and the 8th respondent and that the 8th respondent is in possession of the property and accordingly dismissed the L.G.C. Challenging the same, the 1st respondent filed W.P. 7368 of 1999 whereas respondents 3 to 7 filed W.P. 21542 of 1999. The Government did not file any appeal against the order in L.G.C. 140 of 1989 and therefore the orders of the Special Court attained finality insofar as the Government is concerned.

Learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. 7368 of 1999 Sri N. Vasudeva Reddy contended that the Special Court based its judgment on Ex.B-35, which is the certified copy of judgment in O.S. 107 of 1968 which became final but it is not binding on the writ petitioner inasmuch as the writ petitioner is not a party to the proceedings. He further contended that the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 and Exs.B-1 to B-30 were not at all referred to and no reasons were given by the Special Court to disbelieve the oral testimony of RWs 1 and 2 and also the documents Exs.B-1 to B-30 and therefore the findings are not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence on record and as a matter of fact there was no appreciation of evidence at all which was adduced on behalf of the writ petitioner and hence the judgment under challenge suffers from incurable legal infirmities so as to call for interference by this court.

Learned counsel Mr. Subramaniam, appearing for 3rd

respondent in W.P. 7368 of 1999 contended that as the judgment under Ex.B-35 has become final, the Special Court came to the conclusion that the respondents 1 and 2 have no title or possession of the application schedule property. He further contended that the dismissal of L.G.C. 266 of 1994 operates as *res judicata* against respondents 1 and 2. As the judgment under Ex.B-35 attained its finality, the Special Court rightly gave a finding that the 3rd respondent in the writ petition (8th respondent in the L.G.C.) is the absolute owner and possession of the application schedule property and therefore there is no error apparent on the face of the record so as to call for interference by this court.

We have given out anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the evidence adduced by the parties and the documents marked.

The dispute relates to Ac.2-00 out of a total extent of Ac.9-26 guntas in S.No.129/5 situated at Shaikpet village, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. That survey number corresponds to S.No.403 of Shaikpet village, originally belonging to Surfekhas Mubarak. The writ petitioner in W.P. 7368 of 1999 filed a suit in O.S. 1271 of 1988 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hydrabad for declaration and injunction against the 3rd respondent herein and as per the orders in I.A. 772 of 1988 injunction was made absolute. The petitioner in W.P. 7368 of 1999 also filed O.S. 443 of 1989 against the Government and also the Municipality. The said two suits were transferred and numbered as L.G.Cs. 266 and 267 of 1994

respectively. While the matter stood thus, the Government of A.P. filed L.G.C. 149 of 1989 for declaration that the respondents 1 and 2 are the land grabbers. Both L.G.C. 266 of 1994 and 267 of 1994 were dismissed on 6.5.1997 for non-filing of notice in Form-I. I.A. 71 of 1999 in L.G.C. 266 of 1994 and I.A. 72 of 1999 in L.G.C. 267 of 1994 were filed to condone the delay in filing a petition under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. to set aside the dismissal order dated 6.5.1997 on 21.9.1998, but the said petitions were dismissed by order dated 28.10.1999, which are the subject matters in W.P.Nos. 1662 of 2000 and 1869 of 2000 herein.

There cannot be any dispute that a writ of Ceriorari can be issued if the conclusion upon consideration of the evidence reached by any authority including Tribunal or Court is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all. The object of this writ is to keep the exercise of powers by inferior-judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals within the limits or the jurisdiction assigned to them by law. It is well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review this court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merits of the decision itself. This court can interfere with the orders of the Subordinate Courts and the Tribunals where (1) there is an error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear misreading or utter disregard to the provisions of law and (2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

As seen from the record, the evidence of PW-1 and RWs 1 to 3 has not been appreciated by the learned Special Court. Nowhere in the judgment the Special Court came to the conclusion

that the evidence of PW-1 or the evidence of RWs 1 and 2 is not acceptable. So also, no reasons are assigned for discarding the evidence of PW-1 and RWs 1 and 2 or accepting the evidence of RW-3. So also, the Special Court did not refer to the documents filed on behalf of the applicant, which are numbering 10, including a witness examined on behalf of the court as CW-1 and also Exs.C-1 to C-4. Except referring to Exs.B-35 and B-36, the Special Court did not refer to nor gave any specific finding with regard to any one of the documents filed not only by the applicant but also the documents that were marked on behalf of respondents 1, 2 and 8.

The Special Court constituted under Section 7 of the Land Grabbing Act is empowered to try a case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to or lawful possession of the land grabbing whether before or after commencement of the Act and pass such orders. When a substantive power is conferred upon the Special Court to decide the case with respect to ownership and title also, it will naturally effect the rights of the parties. The process of reasoning by which the Special Court came to the ultimate conclusion should be reflected in the judgment, as the judgment is a self-contained document from which it should appear as to what were the facts f the case and what was the controversy which was tried to be settled by the court and in what manner.

It is also the duty of the court to frame appropriate issues, that is to say, material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other form subject matter of distinct issue. No issue has been

framed whether R-8 is having any right, title and interest in respect of the application schedule property even after he was brought on record. Without there being any issue, the Special Court went to the extent of giving a finding that the 8th respondent is the owner of the application schedule property and 8th respondent is in the possession of the property in question.

Therefore, the judgment under challenge suffers from incurable legal infirmities as the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties has not been referred to or appreciated. So also, except Ex.B-35 and B-36, no reference was made in the impugned judgment whether they are relevant or irrelevant, whether they are admissible or inadmissible. The issues have not been properly framed basing on the pleadings. So also, the judgment under challenge is not a speaking one with reasons for the findings of the court. There was no process of reasoning set out in the judgment for deciding the case one way or the other. Therefore, on two grounds, namely, non-application of evidence and absence of reasons for the decisions in the decision making process which are apparent on the face of the record, the writ petition has to be allowed.

Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, the judgment under challenge in L.G.C. 149 of 1989 is set aside and W.P. 7368 of 1999 is allowed remitting the matter to the Special Court for proper consideration of the evidence on record. Learned counsel appearing for both the parties pointed out that a time-frame may be fixed so as to dispose of L.G.C. 140 of 1989 since the parties are litigating the case for more than a decade. Therefore, a direction is given to the Special Court to dispose of L.G.C. 149 of 1989, which is restored to

its file, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The parties to the case shall not take unnecessary adjournments and for the purpose of disposal of the case the learned Special Court may post the case by giving a day-to-day schedule.

For the reasons stated in W.P. 7368 of 1999, W.P. 21542 of 1999 is also allowed subject to the condition that the writ petitioners in this writ petition were not set ex parte in L.G.C. 140 of 1989 and that they were prosecuting the case when L.G.C. 140 of 1989 was pending on the file of Special Court. If the Special Court satisfies that these two conditions are fulfilled, then only the petitioners in W.P. 21542 of 1999 are at liberty to adduce the evidence, but in the time-frame as fixed above.

In view of the orders passed in W.P. 7368 of 1999, W.P.Nos. 1662 of 2000 and 1869 of 2000 are also allowed remitted to the Special Court since the subject matter in these writ petitions relates to an extent of Ac.2-00 of land and the Special Court has to decide the right, title and interest of the parties. Even though there are some lapses on the part of the petitioner in W.P.Nos. 1662 and 1869 of 2000 in filing petition to set aside the default order under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C., we are allowing these writ petitions without insisting for filing of Form-I as contemplated under the Land Grabbing Act since the petitioner in these petitions is one of the parties in L.G.C.140 of 1989 and since L.G.Cs. 266 of 1994 and 267 of 1994 stood transferred to the Special Court where under the parties are required to give description of the property as required under the Civil Rules of Practice.

In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed and remitted

to the Special Court for disposal according to law. No order as to costs.

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**B. Sudershan Reddy, J.**

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**K.C. Bhanu, J.**

**Date: --11—2004.**

MVB**.**

That Rule Nisi has been made absolute as above.

Witness the Hon'ble Sri Devinder Gupta, the Chief Justice on this Monday, Eighth day of November, Two Thousand and Four.

ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

//TRUE COPY//

SECTION OFFICER

To

1. The Registrar, Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, at Hyderabad, Burugula Ramakrishna Rao Buildings, Lower Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad.

2. The State, Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad.

3. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad.

4. The Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue Department, Hyderabad.

5. The Collector, Hyderabad District, Nampally Station Road, Hyderabad.

6. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Golconda Mandal, Vijayanagar Colony, Hyderabad.

7. The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, Lower Tank Bund, Hyderabad.

8. Two C.Cs. to the Government Pleader for Revenue, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad. (O.U.T.)

9. Two C.D. copies.